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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
The two appeals now before us require us to determine 
whether this court's decision in Patriot Party of Allegheny 
County v. Allegheny County Dep't of Elections, 95 F.3d 253 
(3d Cir. 1996) (Patriot Party I), remains good law in light of 
the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Timmons v. 
Twin Cities Area New Party, 117 S. Ct. 1364 (1997), which 
upheld a Minnesota "anti-fusion" statute against a First 
Amendment attack. Because Patriot Party I held that the 
Pennsylvania statutes at issue here violated the Patriot's 
Party right to the equal protection of the laws, as well as its 
right to freedom of association, and because we conclude 
that our panel is bound by Patriot Party I, at least insofar 
as it held that the statutes violate equal protection, we 
affirm the district court orders in both appeals. 
 
I. 
 
In both cases before us, the Patriot Party of Allegheny 
County challenged 25 Pa. Con. Stat. Ann. SS 2936(e) and 
2911(e)(5) as violating the Party's right to freedom of 
association and its right to the equal protection of the law. 
These Pennsylvania statutes are described in detail in the 
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opinion in Patriot Party I, 95 F.3d at 256-57, but in brief 
they permit the major parties to "fuse" candidates for 
certain local offices but preclude minor parties from 
engaging in this same practice.1 
 
In one of the two appeals (No. 97-3359), we are asked to 
review the order entered by the district court after the 
remand in Patriot Party I. That case began when the Patriot 
Party challenged the constitutionality of the statutes as 
applied to prevent the Party from nominating a particular 
candidate for the position of local school director in 1993 
because he had previously sought the nomination of the 
major parties for that office.2 The district court rejected the 
Party's free association and equal protection claims, holding 
that the state's legitimate interest in regulating its ballot 
justified the restraints that the election code placed on 
minor parties. See Patriot Party I, 95 F.3d at 257. A divided 
panel of our court then reversed and remanded. The 
County and its director of elections petitioned 
unsuccessfully for rehearing, see 95 F.3d at 272, but did 
not seek a writ of certiorari. On remand, the district court 
entered an order on December 11, 1996, declaring that 25 
Pa. Con. Stat. Ann. SS 2936(e) and 2911(e)(5) place an 
unconstitutional burden on the Patriot Party's rights to free 
association and equal protection insofar as they prohibit 
the Party from nominating any person as a candidate for 
the offices in question because that person is also a major 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. "Fusion" is "the nomination by more than one political party of the 
same candidate for the same office in the same general election." 117 
S. Ct. at 1367, n.1, citing Twin Cities Area New Party v. McKenna, 73 
F.3d 196, 197-98 (8th Cir. 1996). 
 
2. In 1993, Michael Eshenbaugh sought the nomination of both the 
Republican and Democratic Parties in the school director election. 
Eshenbaugh won the Democratic (but not the Republican) nomination. 
The Patriot Party then nominated its candidates for the school director 
positions. Eshenbaugh was one such candidate. Eshenbaugh willingly 
accepted the Patriot Party nomination. When Eshenbaugh attempted to 
file his nominating papers, the County informed him that because he 
had previously sought the nomination of the major parties, Pennsylvania 
law prohibited him from filing nomination papers to run on a minor 
party ticket. The Patriot Party then filed suit for declaratory and 
injunctive relief in February 1994. 
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party candidate. The court also enjoined the County and its 
director of elections from enforcing these statutes under 
such circumstances. On April 28, 1997, the Supreme Court 
handed down its decision in Timmons, and two days later, 
the County filed a motion for relief from judgment pursuant 
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). The district court denied the 
motion, and the County appealed. 
 
The other appeal (No. 96-3677) concerns a separate suit 
in which the Patriot Party challenged the same 
Pennsylvania provisions as they were applied to a 1995 
school director election.3 In October 1996, (several months 
before Timmons was decided), the district court granted the 
Patriot Party's motion for summary judgment based on this 
court's decision in Patriot Party I. The district court entered 
an order granting the same declaratory and injunctive relief 
as it did on remand in the case involving the 1993 election. 
The County appealed that order as well. 
 
II. 
 
As noted, a prior panel of our court previously held in 
Patriot Party I that 25 Pa. Con. Stat. Ann.SS 2936(e) and 
2911(e)(5), which prohibit minor but not major parties from 
nominating "fusion" candidates in certain local elections, 
violate minor parties' rights to freedom of association and 
equal protection of the laws, but the Supreme Court later 
held in Timmons that a generally applicable anti-fusion law 
did not infringe the associational rights of a political party 
or voters. Needless to say, we are required to follow 
decisions of the Supreme Court, but it is also our court's 
tradition that a panel may not overrule or disregard a prior 
panel decision unless that decision has been overruled by 
the Supreme Court or by our own court sitting en banc. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. On May 16, 1995, the Patriot Party nominated Barbara Childress for 
the 1995 school director election in North Allegheny School District. 
Childress filed the appropriate nomination papers with the County's 
Department of Election. Childress then won the Republican and 
Democratic nominations for the election. In late May, the Department 
informed Childress that the Pennsylvania Code prohibited Childress from 
seeking a nomination by a minor party since she had previously filed a 
nomination petition. 
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See Nationwide Ins. Co. of Columbus, Ohio v. Patterson, 953 
F.2d 44, 46 (3d Cir. 1991). Here, we conclude that Patriot 
Party I's equal protection holding was not overruled by 
Timmons and that while the reasoning underpinning that 
holding is arguably in tension with the Supreme Court's 
reasoning in Timmons, it is not clear that reconciliation is 
impossible. Under these circumstances, we do not feel free 
to disregard another panel's decision. 
 
In Patriot Party I, a panel of this courtfirst concluded 
that Pennsylvania's fusion ban violated the Patriot Party's 
right to freedom of association. The panel looked to the 
standard set out in Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic 
Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 222 (1989), and Anderson v. 
Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983). Under this standard, 
a court must first inquire whether a challenged election law 
burdens First Amendment rights. 95 F.3d at 258. If it does, 
the court must gauge the character and magnitude of the 
burden and weigh it against the importance of any 
countervailing state interests. Id. The court must examine 
not only the legitimacy and strength of the state's proffered 
interests, but also the necessity of burdening the plaintiff 's 
rights in order to protect those interests. Id. If the burden 
on the plaintiff 's rights is severe, the state's interests must 
be compelling, and the law must be narrowly tailored to 
serve the state's interests. Id. 
 
Applying this standard, the Patriot Party I panel held that 
the challenged Pennsylvania laws were unconstitutional. 95 
F.3d 268. The court concluded that the statutes burdened 
the Patriot Party in two ways: (1) by preventing the Party 
from nominating the standard bearer whom the party 
believes "will most effectively advance its program and 
platform" and (2) by depriving the Party of its ability to 
"fuse" its votes with those of a major party and thus make 
inroads into the political process. Id. at 258-61. The panel 
found that these burdens were severe and that 
Pennsylvania was accordingly required to demonstrate that 
the statutes were narrowly tailored to serve compelling 
interests. Id. at 264. The panel decided, however, that the 
County's proffered justifications for the fusion ban did not 
meet this stringent test. Id. at 264. The court reviewed the 
interests asserted by the County -- preventing sore loser 
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candidates, preventing independent candidates from 
monopolizing the ballot or causing voter confusion, 
preventing candidates from "bleeding off" independent 
candidates, and encouraging new candidates to run as 
independents -- and found each of them to be insufficient. 
Id. at 267-68. 
 
The panel then turned to the equal protection analysis, 
noting that this analysis was "similar in many respects to 
the balancing test that [the panel] applied to[the] free 
association claim." 95 F.3d at 269. Under the equal 
protection analysis, the panel followed the Supreme Court's 
decision in Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968). 95 F.3d 
at 268. In accordance with that decision, the panel 
examined whether the Pennsylvania laws created invidious 
classifications. 95 F.3d at 269, (citing Williams, 393 U.S. at 
30). Specifically, the panel measured the totality of the 
burden that the laws placed on the voting and associational 
rights of the Patriot Party against the justifications that 
Pennsylvania offered to support the law. 95 F.3d at 269, 
(citing Williams, 393 U.S. at 34). The panel then held that 
Pennsylvania's decision to ban cross-nominations by minor 
political parties and to allow cross-nomination by major 
parties constituted the type of "invidious classifications" 
prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause. 95 F.3d at 269. 
The court noted that the Pennsylvania statutes laws treated 
minor and major parties differently and placed a more 
severe burden on minor political parties' rights. Id. at 269. 
In weighing these burdens against Pennsylvania's proffered 
justifications, the court restated its earlier conclusion that 
the County had offered no compelling justification for 
Pennsylvania's facially discriminatory laws. Id. at 269-70. 
Indeed, the panel went so far as to state that the 
Pennsylvania scheme "impose[d] . . . unequal burdens on 
the right to vote and the right to associate without 
protecting any significant countervailing state interest." Id. 
at 269. 
 
In Timmons, the Supreme Court, like the Patriot Party I 
panel, applied the test established in Eu and Anderson to 
determine whether Minnesota's general fusion ban violated 
the right to freedom of association, but the Court concluded 
that the Minnesota fusion ban did not violate this right. 
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117 S. Ct. at 1370-71. The Court determined that the 
burdens imposed on the minor political parties' 
associational rights by Minnesota's anti-fusion statute, 
"though not trivial," were not severe. Id. at 1372. The Court 
explicitly rejected the contention that the ban imposed a 
severe burden because it might preclude a party from 
nominating the individual whom it most desired as its 
standard bearer. Id. at 1370 ("[t]hat a particular individual 
may not appear on the ballot as a particular party's 
candidate does not severely burden that party's 
associational rights"). Additionally, the Court indicated that 
the anti-fusion statute did not create a severe burden on 
the party's attempts to organize: "Minnesota has not 
directly precluded minor political parties from developing 
and organizing . . . . Nor has Minnesota excluded . . . a 
political party[ ] from participation in the election process." 
Id. at 1371. 
 
Because the Timmons Court found that the burdens on 
minor political parties were not severe, the Court conducted 
a "less exacting review" of Minnesota's proffered 
justifications. 117 S. Ct. at 1370. Under this review, 
"important regulatory interests" are enough to justify 
"reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions." Id. Although 
the Court declined to consider Minnesota's interest in 
avoiding voter confusion, the Court concluded that the 
burdens imposed on minor political parties by Minnesota's 
fusion ban were justified by "correspondingly weighty" state 
interests in ballot integrity and political stability. Id. at 
1375. 
 
Although Timmons, unlike the suits brought by the 
Patriot Party, did not involve an equal protection claim, 
there is plainly at least some tension between the Supreme 
Court's reasoning in Timmons and the Patriot Party I panel's 
equal protection analysis. As the Patriot Party I panel 
opinion recognized, the balancing test used to determine 
whether an election law violates a political party's right to 
freedom of association is similar to the test employed to 
determine whether an election law violates a political 
party's equal protection rights. 95 F.3d at 269 ("our 
analysis of the Patriot Party's equal protection claim is 
similar in many respects to the balancing test that we 
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applied to its free association claim."). The Supreme Court's 
reasoning in Timmons may thus affect the continuing 
validity of the panel's equal protection analysis in Patriot 
Party I. However, the anti-fusion law at issue in Timmons 
did not facially discriminate, as does the fusion ban in the 
present case. As a result, although the burdens imposed by 
Pennsylvania's fusion ban are in some respects quite 
similar to those created by the Minnesota statute, the 
burdens on the Patriot Party may be magnified because 
they are not applied equally to all political parties. 
 
Furthermore, even if the burdens created by the two 
states' fusion bans are regarded as essentially the same for 
present purposes, and the Pennsylvania fusion ban places 
less than severe burdens on the Patriot Party's rights, it is 
not entirely clear that Pennsylvania's interests are 
sufficiently weighty to justify those burdens. Because each 
state's fusion ban serves different interests, we do not 
believe that the Supreme Court's decision in Timmons is 
necessarily fatal to this court's earlier conclusion that the 
election laws do not protect significant state interests. See 
Patriot Party I, 95 F.3d at 269. In addition, as the previous 
panel noted, the fact that Pennsylvania permits major 
parties to cross-nominate weakens the validity of 
Pennsylvania's asserted interests. See 95 F.3d at 267. For 
all these reasons, we do not feel free to disregard the panel 
opinion in Patriot Party I. 
 
III. 
 
Because the Supreme Court's decision in Timmons did 
not overrule the prior panel's equal protection holding in 
Patriot Party I, there are no extraordinary circumstances to 
justify granting the County's Rule 60(b) motion. Rule 
60(b)(6) is available only in extraordinary circumstances. 
Martinez-McBean v. Government of Virgin Islands, 562 F.2d 
908, 911 (3d Cir. 1977).4 Intervening developments in the 
law by themselves rarely constitute the extraordinary 
circumstances required for relief under Rule 60(b)(6). Polites 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The County originally moved for relief from judgment under Rule 
60(b)(4) and (6). On appeal, however, they requested relief under Rule 
60(b)(6). 
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v. United States, 364 U.S. 426, 433 (1960). However, this 
rule is not to be inflexibly applied. Id. 
 
Because the Supreme Court's decision in Timmons did 
not clearly overrule the equal protection holding in Patriot 
Party I, it does not provide the extraordinary circumstances 
needed for Rule 60(b)(6) relief. As a result, that holding 
remains binding circuit law, and the district court had no 
basis for granting the County relief. We note that if 
Timmons had explicitly overruled this court's equal 
protection holding in Patriot Party I, that intervening change 
in law, coupled with the prospective nature of the district 
court's injunction and the district court's declaration that 
Pennsylvania's statute was unconstitutional, might 
constitute the extraordinary circumstances needed for relief 
under Rule 60(b)(6). We need not decide this issue, 
however, since the Patriot Party I equal protection holding 
is binding on this panel. 
 
IV. 
 
For these reasons, we affirm the orders of the district 
court in both of the appeals now before us. 
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